After the Earthquake of 1906 Did the Population Increase Again

1At the plow of the twentieth century, San Francisco'south nigh hit concrete feature was the great multitude of boats and ships crowded forth the city's waterfront and extending far into San Francisco Bay. Communication, transportation, and above all trade and commerce had been the central ingredients in transforming arid, air current-swept hills and sand dunes into a bustling urban center. Although the nature of merchandise appurtenances inverse, the motility of commodities and people in and out of the city grew constantly and apace in the nineteenth century, shaping San Francisco's social strafication, its labor market, and the city's political ability construction. Past 1900, San Francisco had too joined with other major American cities in developing a progressive social reform movement and in the first decade of the twentieth century it distinguished itself with a potent Workingman's party that briefly dominated city politics. The utter devastation of the 1906 convulsion and fire interrupted the path of San Francisco'due south social, political, and economical development, leaving in its wake a scramble for reconstruction. An exploration of some of the tensions resulting from conflicting visions of reconstruction in San Francisco provides an illustration of some of the enduring issues involved in many American mail service-catastrophe urban scenarios.

Prologue: growth of a western outpost

2As early as the 1790s, Yerba Buena village (nowadays-day San Francisco) was an outpost for New England fur traders, specializing especially in seal and body of water otter. The 1830s brought rapid change to the region as the fur-bearing sea mammal population plummeted while the Mexican Revolution brought virtually the secularization of California missions and encouraged the expansion of private landholdings. With the simultaneous increase in demand from expanding shoe manufactories in the Boston area, Yerba Buena's trade shifted in the 1830s from furs to the hides provided by the extensive Californio cattle ranches. San Francisco'due south function as California'south coastal warehouse was fabricated permanent with the 1849 gold rush and the extended silver smash in the 1860s. Trade continued to be the economic center of the city well afterward the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869. Aided by the rapid expansion of railroads, California industrial agronomics developed in the 1870s and 1880s with immense wheat farms, chop-chop diversifying into vegetable and fruit crops, forth with the accompanying drying, canning, wine-making, and beer-brewing industries. The majority of exports left the state through San Francisco [1].

3San Francisco's economical growth came not only from trade and commerce, just from local industrial development likewise. Logically enough in the context of the gilded rush, one of the showtime industrial plants located in San Francisco was Donahues' Union Shovel Works, established in 1849 at Mission and First Streets, south of Market Street. Other manufactories followed, and past 1875 San Francisco was a major supplier for the worldwide market place in mining machinery and equipment. Iron foundries and car shops were located peculiarly in the due south of Market place Street surface area, as well as west forth the bayshore to the Presidio. Foundries continued to expand south of Market and past the 1880s were producing heavy equipment, engines, locomotives, and other mechanism to equip not only mining, but also transportation and agronomical firms. By the tardily 1880s, the Donahue brothers' shovel mill, renamed the Union Fe Works, had grown into a major found employing over 1,200 workers. Merely one of many heavy industrial plants and iron and steel mills along the southern bayshore, Union Iron Works occupied fifteen acres and included a shipyard, rolling mill, foundries, design shops, machine shops, and a large hydraulic lift dock (Vance, 1964, 26; Issel and Cherny, 30; Blum, 1989, thirteen, xvi).

4A constant influx of capital from mining and agriculture, forth with San Francisco's industrial development and population growth, stimulated a long-term edifice blast in the metropolis. Beginning in the 1850s, the sand hills that were the nearly prominent feature of San Francisco were gradually cut through or levelled, with the sand used to fill in shallow bayshore coves and mudflats [two]. Streets were laid out and paved with redwood planking. The gold rush prompted the need for a stock exchange, and in the 1860s this was located at Montgomery and Washington Streets, in what is still the heart of the city's financial district. To the east of this area, beyond Sansome Street, a produce district had by the 1870s expanded onto the at present filled Yerba Buena Cove. A wholesale and warehouse district adult southward of Market Street between Red china Bowl and Mission Streets, and Mission Bay was gradually filled in. Businesses building, repairing, and supplying the ships that made the San Francisco harbor a forest of masts likewise established themselves in the city. Other smaller industries were increasingly present in San Francisco as well, as was a salubrious service sector. Inexpensive hotels and restaurants, saloons, and laundries all thrived as the city's population grew. In the 1880s and 1890s, the fiscal district underwent a rebuilding, and ornate steel-frame highrises were erected. Pocket-sized manufactories, peculiarly cigar and garment makers, expanded, located especially in or well-nigh Chinatown. Toward the port were housed the many import and export firms and the vast warehouses needed to store goods before shipment (Lewis, 1980, xiii, 136, 172-173; Vance, twenty, 27; Issel and Cherny, 29; Tygiel, 1992, 85).

5Although overall employment in all sectors greatly increased from the 1870s into the twentieth century, the proportions of workers in different areas slowly shifted from manufacturing and service to professions, trade, and transportation. In 1900, San Francisco was firmly situated both as Pacific coast warehouse and trade center, equally well as financial and corporate capital of the due west, but its position as the leading west coast manufacturing site was offset to decline. In 1890, over one-half the manufacturing businesses in California were located in the city, producing almost two-thirds of the total output. In 1900, this had declined to less than one-3rd of the production sites, and just 44% of the output. This was due in part to the general growth of California, which allowed access to advantageous physical sites for industrial development. Information technology was likewise due to rising competition from other west declension urban areas (Issel and Cherny, 54-55; Tygiel, 86-87).

A city of ethnic and class diversity

6San Francisco experienced rapid population growth, get-go with gold rush fortune-seekers in 1849 and continuing with job-seekers attracted past the dramatic expansion of the city's economical base of operations. In 1847, fewer than five hundred people lived in Yerba Buena village. This exploded to approximately five grand past 1849. Exponential population growth continued into the twentieth century, with about 57,000 people living in the newly rebaptized city of San Francisco in 1860, 343,000 in 1900, and 417,000 in 1910. An initially disproportionate ratio among white San Franciscans of 85% men to xv% women in 1852 had by 1900 settled to a more balanced ratio of 55% men to 45% women. While in 1900, 65% of white San Franciscans were born in the United states of america, lxx% were either strange-born (30%) or with foreign-born parents (forty%). Of the San Franciscans with foreign-born parents, 27.5% were of Irish origin, 22.9% German, 10.1% British or English language-speaking Canadian, 6.2% Italian, 5.9% Scandinavian, and 27.4% from various other regions of Europe. Chinese and Japanese residents fabricated upward 4.6% of the metropolis'southward population in 1900, and black Americans 0.v%. Although the 1900 census does not provide information near Mexicans or other Latinos, the 1930 demography estimates that 1.2% of the city's overall population was Mexican (Tygiel, 17; Issel and Cherny, 12-13, 24, 55-56; Ethington, 1992, 425).

7As shown by these figures, San Francisco at the turn of the century was predominately white American, with a loftier percentage of immigrants. The Irish gaelic had been the kickoff to go far after the gold blitz and remained the largest single ethnic grouping in the city. The next largest group was a mix of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish Germans. Until the outbreak of World War One, the fastest charge per unit of population growth was among Italians, who began arriving late in the nineteenth century (Issel and Cherny, 1986, 55-56). Forth with native-born white Americans, working class residents belonging to these European groups were all regular recipients of social assistance from a diversity of charity groups [3].

8The smallest ethnic group in San Francisco was the city's African-American population, numbering i,642 individuals in 1900. Black San Franciscans did not live in enclaves, but were dispersed throughout the city. In spite of this residential integration, African-Americans appear to have been largely excluded from the efforts of the major official clemency organizations in the postal service-1906 period. The largest, Associated Charities of San Francisco, prided itself on being the merely big clemency that helped all residents of the metropolis regardless of ethnicity or religion, but blackness San Franciscans were not included [four].

9Nor were Asians. In contrast to the metropolis'southward black community, San Francisco'south Chinese population of 13,954 people in 1900 was highly ghettoized and with few exceptions forbidden to live or work anywhere in the city outside of Chinatown. Chinatown was an almost autonomous zone in the city, governed and administered past the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association and diverse kin-based and commune associations. A flourishing vice and prostitution industry was the most porous commercial attribute of Chinatown, drawing customers from all of San Francisco's male population. Although some Christian missionaries fighting against prostitution worked in Chinatown, larger charities did non help Chinese individuals or families. Mostly, if agencies fabricated any mention of Asian San Franciscans, it was in the form of anti-Asian agitation [5].

10As in other American cities of the late nineteenth century, San Francisco's working course population experienced pregnant employment and housing instability, aggravated past the urban center'southward position equally a corking port and the only major urban area servicing a huge western hinterland. San Francisco provided a winter haven for the many thousands of seasonal workers employed in western extractive industries, such as mining, lumbering, angling, and industrial farming. The accompanying processing plants too operated largely on a seasonal basis. Seasonal employment was common besides for resident San Franciscans employed in the sizeable local building and structure manufacture, besides as for more mobile construction workers on California road and railroad projects. In wintertime many unemployed workers joined their families in their urban center homes. Others lived off their scanty savings, renting rooms or beds and paying for inexpensive meals in the neighborhoods along the waterfront and south of Market Street [six].

11Residential districts bordering early on business and manufacturing areas demonstrated substantial fluidity. A French neighborhood along Dupont Avenue gave way to Chinatown, centered on the renamed Grant Avenue. South Park was an early on upper-class enclave, but with expansion of the warehouse and industrial district south of Market Street, wealthy San Franciscans moved their homes north toward Nob Hill and Pacific Heights. The silver profits of the 1860s and 1870s brought a solid base of capital which immune banks to finance the city's continued rapid growth. Streets were repaired and graded and wooden sidewalks installed. Substantial brick and wood buildings were erected, including schools, libraries, churches, hospitals, and asylums. The city'south expanding industrial base provided for the new streetcar lines that crisscrossed the growing city, opening residential and industrial zones up to development (Vance, xix-21, 114-115, 117).

12The largely Irish and German working class neighborhoods on and around Telegraph Hill, located north of Market Street, began shifting to outlying areas with the increased arrival immigrants from southern Europe. Working and eye form neighborhoods stretched to the south in the Mission, Potrero, and Visitacion Valley districts, and north of Golden Gate Park to the w in the Richmond district. From the 1870s to about 1900, building associations brought large tracts of land in the outer portions of these new streetcar suburbs, and built hundreds of houses. These were made available to stably employed families for moderate down payments and mortgages provided by local banks. Heavy fogs and steep hills in central San Francisco still blocked residential construction in the southwestern quarter of the city (Vance, 1964, 31, 174; Issel and Cherny, 1986, 27-30; Tygiel, 1992, 38).

On the eve of disaster

13The majority of working class San Franciscans connected to alive closer to the center of the city in 1906, in the neighborhoods just south of Market Street. This area was crowded with many small wooden frame buildings. Apartments and lodging houses were often located above small shops and saloons along primary thoroughfares, and houses and flats lined the smaller streets and alleys cutting through the blocks. Many residential hotels provided additional inexpensive housing. The other almost densely inhabited area of San Francisco was Chinatown, which housed almost all of the Chinese population of the city in an area three blocks long and 7 blocks broad. The disaster would hit these neighborhood the hardest [7].

Disaster relief equally a new historical lens

14Historians of San Francisco accept long asserted that the earthquake and fire of April 1906 were simply blips on the timeline of the city's history, dramatic but relatively unimportant events that in no way inverse the form of San Francisco's economical, social, or political development [8]. This perspective may have its roots in the disaster'south immediate aftermath. In the effort to encourage investment and rapid economic recovery, the San Francisco municipal government systematically underestimated death rates and other indicators of loss in order to minimize the devastation (Fradkin, 2005, 189). This paper, using post-disaster housing equally a historical lens, demonstrates the fallacy of this view. The failed promise of post-disaster housing reveals an overlooked withal highly significant chapter in San Francisco history. What might seem to be a design for disaster has unrealized potential to propose possibilities for recovery and rebirth [ix].

Tabula rasa

15The earthquake struck the yet slumbering urban center at five:12 the morning of Wednesday, Apr 18, 1906. Qualified as "moderately large", information technology acquired the firsthand collapse of endless buildings, including the home of the San Francisco burn chief, who was killed almost instantly while comatose in his bed. Even more than ominously, the earthquake broke the natural gas and h2o mains laid in the built areas of San Francisco, more often than not in fragile country-fill up that tended to liquify when jolted past earthquakes. Within hours countless fires spread into a conflagration that without water, firefighters were unable to contain. In a 4-day menstruation the city was largely consumed. Upward to 4,000 people were killed and thousands more injured [x]. The disaster's combined forces destroyed almost all of the infrastructure and physical institute at the base of operations of San Francisco'south economy. All streetcar lines were out of operation and streets were piled loftier with masses of masonry and iron. The telephone system and the telegraph and telegram offices were destroyed, as were the banks, hotels, apartment buildings, thousands of houses, and all but a scattering of outlying bakeries and stores. Most commercial districts were levelled and the full general upheaval created a tremendous setback to San Francisco manufacturers striving to maintain their competitive position. The disaster likewise destroyed most of the metropolis'due south housing stock, especially in the densely inhabited older working class neighborhoods. Only a few small pockets of the burned district escaped devastation, including the wharves and dock areas upward to two blocks into boondocks. While the fire burned, refugees gathered in city parks with what belongings they managed to accept with them. At the end of the iii-twenty-four hour period fire, most 250,000 people were living without food in makeshift tents and shacks in parks and scattered lots outside the burned area [11]. The scale of the need experienced past all social classes and groups was astounding, making all the more impressive the speed with which the city rebuilt itself. Lost in the story of that rebuilding have been the efforts of poor San Franciscans to establish control over their lives every bit they fought for bones rights to housing and jobs [12].

Fig. 1

Burned commune in San Francisco, 1906*

Burned district in San Francisco, 1906*

*The white spaces on the map signal the few spots inside the burned district that escaped destruction.

Dreams of a new model city

16Following the 1906 disaster, progressive reformers saw a golden opportunity in the "bully purification by fire" of San Francisco's vice and prostitution districts as well as residential working class neighborhoods [thirteen]. Ambitious social reforms were put into practice to have advantage of the vast destruction of the urban center's neighborhoods and infrastructure. Nature had indeed created a tabula rasa. Out of the ruins, reformers predictable the rising of a new model metropolis, i harmoniously designed to eliminate social tensions, and modernized to avert public wellness issues. Above all, the new San Francisco would eliminate ancient vices by transforming a metropolis of apartments, lodging houses, and hotels into a paradise of pocket-size homes. Each lot would allow men and women to conduct out the roles prescribed to their gender: As wives lovingly cared for the habitation, husbands would tend to the vegetable garden. These gardens would produce wholesome food for the family unit, and provide plenty of fresh air and room in which children could engage in healthy play. In living out the American dream, the proud laboring owners of these modest, single-family homes would work difficult and cultivate independence, self-reliance, and all the other democratic virtues and values touted past the center class.

17The goal of recreating working class neighborhoods in mail-1906 San Francisco ultimately roughshod victim to class and race-based prejudices fueled by commercial opportunism. But such results are not inevitable. San Francisco'southward original recovery effort featured a vibrant and initially quite successful programme to serve the housing needs of low-income residents displaced by the earthquake. The story of the creation of a flourishing working-class housing development that allowed for nobility and self-reliance reveals the possibilities for real post-disaster recovery. It also highlights the power of the opposition to such developments and suggests ways to identify and combat those forces.

The role of race, class, and gender in the disaster's immediate aftermath

18The earthquake and fire hitting the poorest San Franciscans the hardest. On the eve of the quake, the poorest workers lived in old, run-downwardly boarding houses and apartments. Employment was scarce and poorly paid. Working families, particularly those living in the south of Marketplace Street neighborhood, often stretched their incomes past taking boarders into their already crowded homes [xiv]. The flimsy construction of these neighborhoods guaranteed their destruction by the quake and burn down. With most housing burnt to the ground, rents immediately soared 350%, and in 1910 were still 71% higher than pre-fire rates (Kazin, 1987, 125). Women faced especially severe problems, equally their manufacturing and service employments disappeared along with the income they had received for cooking, cleaning, and laundering for lodgers. Asian San Franciscans faced additional barriers to survival. In the weeks following the disaster, Chinese refugees remained segregated and were relocated four times past urban center and armed services officials in response to whites who refused to share space with the much-despised Asians. Although ultimately unsuccessful in their efforts, city developers seized upon the devastation of Chinatown, located on some of the virtually valuable belongings in the city, equally the perfect solution to ridding the city of Asians once and for all. Asian San Franciscans were totally excluded from official relief efforts [fifteen].

The convulsion cottage every bit solution: "A beneficial effect… for the coming generation"

19Measures to remake the city began even as the fires still burned. The U.S. Ground forces organized San Franciscans into refugee camps and imposed martial law. Mayor Eugene Schmitz appointed a flurry of committees drawn largely from the city'south business aristocracy. James Phelan incorporated his powerful finance committee as the San Francisco Relief and Ruddy Cross Funds, known equally the Relief Committee, in July of 1906 (Kahn, 1979, 137-138); President Theodore Roosevelt sent the influential Dr. Edward Devine to oversee the initial operations of the Red Cross, which coordinated the work of local charities, including the most prominent, the Associated Charities of San Francisco (ACSF), headed by Katherine Felton [16]. Pursuing their objective of fundamentally reforming San Francisco's housing for the benefit of the working poor, the Relief Committee constructed five,610 two and three-room woods frame cottages. Although Kevin Rozario suggests that the quality of the cottages was deliberately kept minimal by concern leaders unwilling to "interfere with the private property market", they were enthusiastically described by Devine as "bonny, sanitary, safe, and yet comparatively inexpensive dwellings which will take a beneficial effect non just in the immediate hereafter but for the coming generation" [17].

20The small light-green transportable "earthquake cottages", as they came to be known, were placed in parks and on other public lands. The U.S. Army, under the leadership of Full general Adolphus Greely, presided over these refugee camps immediately following the disaster. Residents initially lived under "the most rigid [military] supervision" [18]. Later on the withdrawal of the armed services on 30 June 1906, Felton and F. W. Dohrmann, vice-chairman of the Relief Committee, managed the camps, helped relocate the cottages onto lots throughout the metropolis, and eased the refugees' transition into non-supervised city life [19].

21The ultimate goal of the cottage-lease system was single-family home ownership. The cottages were leased for one yr at $2.00 a month. The monies collected were later refunded to the lessee. At the end of the year the cottager became a homeowner, although he or she yet had to secure a private lot on which to motion the cottage. After losing their homes and frequently their jobs in the 1906 disaster, many families institute respite and recovery in their new houses as they worked successfully to reconstruct their lives. ACSF caseworkers identified peculiarly worthy families that owned or were buying the lot on which their earthquake cottage was placed. For instance, the Hamlins' pocket-sized two-room cottage provided inadequate space for the family of viii, but it was on a lot that they owned. Impressed by their self-sufficiency, the caseworker recommended that the ACSF requite the family unit a rare building grant of $300.00, "as this family has not applied to us for assist" [20].

22Earthquake cottages relocated to residential districts of the metropolis came to social workers' attention nation-wide every bit bright spots in the years of the stubborn recession that began in 1907, aggravated in San Francisco by the lingering furnishings of the earthquake and fire equally well every bit a prolonged streetcar strike. In 1909, some observers recognized the benign influence of these unmarried family homes: out of the "unlikely heritage of the calamity […] a miracle was wrought". Hundreds of families "are to be found in many of the residence districts of the city […] learning the fine art of home making" [21]. That same twelvemonth, an observer deputed by the Red Cantankerous noted the immovability of the earthquake cottages and reported agreeably on improvements made to the original structures: "It was very prissy indeed how the trivial cottages seem to endure the rigors of the rain and hot sun of the Pacific Coast […]. Equally a rule they have been somewhat rebuilt; take been raised off the ground; front porches and rear kitchens accept been added; they have been shingled and painted and set in the midst of gardens of blooming plants and shrubs and form beautiful little suburban homes, in which anyone would exist content and happy. The forest work as far as I observed was in practiced state of preservation. There did not seem to be any rotting of the sills; the roofs seemed tight and birthday the wisdom of issuing these houses has been more than proved [22]."

23As the about ardent supporter of cottage living, the ACSF regularly sent social workers to foster its experiment. They encouraged vegetable gardens and proudly reported families weathering difficult times by living off their own produce. The modest size of the cottages was praised for encouraging salubrious outdoor living. The Associated Charities ended that fifty-fifty the most apprehensive cottage was "infinitely better than the best tenement", providing the beneficial "influence of a comfortable home upon men and women" [23]. Those fortunate enough to alive in the earthquake cottages enjoyed all the benefits of single-family domicile life so celebrated by the experts as being conducive to establishing proper values and expert citizenship.

The earthquake cottage as obstacle

24Although more one-half the cottages had been moved out of camps by the spring of 1907, the Relief Commission came nether abiding attack past many middle course San Franciscans. Complaints centered around ii themes: the camps in city parks were depriving deserving citizens of much-needed open up infinite, and the camps were creating a course of idlers and paupers [24]. San Francisco's business elite led the critical chorus, seeking to exploit the tabula rasa left by the disaster by maximizing real estate investments on land made vacant, and potentially valuable, by the earthquake and fire. The working class families living in earthquake cottages or other modestly built homes—so celebrated by social reformers—were viewed by business interests as obstacles to be overcome.

25Once the initial housing emergency was resolved and some of the city's parks restored to open infinite, San Francisco'due south cultural elite joined the chorus of critics. Working class homes set in centrally located neighborhoods were inconsistent with their city cute movement. Leaders of this move, including Phelan and saccharide businesswoman Adolph Spreckels, had ever been reserved in their support of the cottage housing plan championed past reformers. While they tolerated the cottages that had been moved to outlying areas of San Francisco, they did not want them in neighborhoods shut to the urban center center. Shared interests created a new alliance. San Francisco's upper middle and wealthy classes united with the business elite and engaged in a series of aggressive efforts to raze entire working-grade residential neighborhoods. While the reasons cited ranged from cultural and social concerns to economic priorities, the master method was the proclamation of a series of public wellness emergencies requiring the destruction of working class homes, including the reformers' cherished convulsion cottages. San Francisco is hardly the only city to take used questionable claims of public wellness risks to dictate urban planning favourable to the business organization and social elite, simply information technology leveraged those assertions especially aggressively [25].

Threats to public health: real, exaggerated, and imagined

26Immediately post-obit the 1906 disaster, risks to public health were very existent. The lack of clean h2o supplies, the cleaved sewage arrangement, and accumulating garbage and debris led to high rates of typhoid and smallpox. To avoid a panic that could harm relief efforts, health officials dealt with the trouble of disease discreetly. Those disease outbreaks were controlled past late 1906. Even so, in the following year a new and even more frightening wellness threat appeared: the bubonic plague. San Franciscans had an ongoing preoccupation with the plague. An outbreak in 1900, largely bars to Chinatown, killed 285 people, with 401 more than ill, resulting in health officials ordering the extensive sabotage of Chinatown housing. In its wake, many Californians augmented their anti-Asian bias with the fearfulness that the disease would reappear, arriving on the Pacific Coast on trade ships from Asia, where the plague remained active. In Apr 1907, a instance of plague was reported to wellness officials, who expressed no business organization publicly. By June, fourteen persons had contracted the disease but metropolis officials even so did not declare a public health problem. In spite of the Lath of Health'south rise business organization, business interests (who controlled the printing) opposed whatever broad scale campaign against the affliction because a panic would threaten the economic recovery of the urban center. The almanac written report of the Board of Wellness reflected the frustration of its officials: "A very serious obstacle to [prevention] efforts, yet, was encountered in the mental attitude of the printing, which with one notable exception, either did not print whatever news on the subject at all or was openly combative to the efforts of the Wellness authorities." This changed when physician and law professor Dr. Edward Taylor became mayor in July. Taylor had been appointed in the midst of the notorious San Francisco graft trials. In his efforts to restore health to the municipal administration, he took immediate and vigorous activity to stamp out disease (Fradkin, 221-223; Craddock, 2000, 139, 147-148; Lewis, 1980, 204; Issel and Cherny, 1986, 157).

27When 50-five plague cases were reported in July, Taylor appealed to the U.s.a. Surgeon General for aid. Sixteen public health officers were dispatched to San Francisco to carry out what 1 observer called the "virtually intensive rat hunt in history" (Lewis, 1980, 204-205). More than 400 paid workers, joined by thousands of volunteers, trapped or poisoned rats. Over the next several months, over 150,000 rats were examined and exterminated. With the deaths of the rats, human plague cases declined sharply. In October 1907, twoscore-four new cases were reported, and so thirty-4 in November, down to ten in December. In 1908 the rate dropped rapidly to four cases in January, and a single last case in February. The rat extermination programme continued until November, when the U.Southward. Public Wellness Service officially announced the finish of the disease—and their campaign [26].

28The city government's arroyo to the problem posed by rats infected with bubonic plague reveals more just an effort to protect public health. Its measures to command the disease rationalized the massive destruction of working class homes, specially and precisely in those neighborhoods with the near existent estate potential. Some of its actions flew in the face of the known facts of the epidemic. It was well established, for example, that the disease did not originate due to a lack of sanitation in working form neighborhoods. San Francisco's Health Lath reported that sailors, contaminated in other parts of the world, were responsible for the original outbreak. Its initial spread was confined not to the residents of convulsion cottages and other depression income housing, but to patients and workers in the Urban center and County Infirmary. The Board also revealed that a multifariousness of factors inhibited or enhanced the spread of the illness. This fact rendered ineffective the urban center's "one size fits all" remedy of destroying working class neighborhoods. For example, the affliction disappeared in the winter months due to cold and moisture conditions that interfered with its means of manual [27]. Even so, the fright of plague generated a wave of panic directed primarily against neighborhoods in which refugee cottages were concentrated. In an repeat of San Francisco'southward vigilante by, merchants formed the Citizens Health Committee and patrolled working class neighborhoods, trapping rats and reporting to the Wellness Lath where those found to have the illness were caught [28].

Immigration the relief camps

29The near aggressive measures to "clean up" the city began with those cottages still situated in parks. According to the Relief Commission, in Apr 1907 about 20,000 people were paying leases in order to live in cottages in the remaining refugee camps. Frederick Dorhmann, the Relief Commission'south camp organizer, pointed out that it would have "many months and much try before the families that lost all they had in the fire will take [alternating] accommodations" [29]. Rudolph Spreckels, head of the Relief Committee'south Camps Department, and friend and business concern associate of James Phelan, led the button to shut the camps. No sites for the relocation of the cottages were secured, investigated or even suggested past Spreckels or other members of the Camps Department. His lack of business concern for the welfare of their residents is reflected in his declaration that he would have the cottages "all removed from the camps inside the next 2 months if he [had] to take the buildings torn down over the heads of refugees" [thirty]. Articles in the San Francisco Chronicle in late August 1907 confirm the hostility towards both camps and refugees alike. The Relief Corporation was quoted as saying, "some [refugees] testify signs of settled stubbornness, merely for these there will be an especial fate meted out in time, for everybody must motility". On a single Lord's day in August, 50-seven cottages were removed from eleven camps, and over 700 cottages were moved in that month alone. The parks were rapidly cleared, not because they had been centers of disease, merely to brand them, every bit the Relate put it, "once more than at the disposal of the public at big […] to obtain a wholesome outing" [31].

30Some camp residents organized themselves into groups and petitioned the Relief Committee to delay immigration the parks. They were supported by Dohrmann, who submitted to the national Red Cross headquarters their resolution for a one-twelvemonth removal moratorium to permit residents time to find vacant lots on which to move their cottages. Dohrmann praised "the spirit which prompted these people […]. It seems to me to show the correct feeling of self-aid, which does non be amid paupers" [32]. The Relief Commission did not grant the cottagers' petition. Residents obtained a temporary restraining order which stopped evictions until the court overturned it and ordered all metropolis parks cleared [33].

31Over the summer of 1907, the ACSF moved approximately 3,000 cottages, installing them on private lots with the plumbing paid. This orderly dispersal of cottages turned into a panic when Spreckels, with stiff backing from San Francisco'southward business and social aristocracy and the courts, ordered all camps closed by the end of the year. Many people were injured and cottages and belongings damaged in hurried moves. Teamsters raised their prices. The ACSF was unable to fund all the applications for assist. The Chronicle reported that 1 "old woman, has offered every known pretext for remaining in the park […]. Yesterday, the Park Commission ordered the cottage torn downward, and this was done in the afternoon, the woman'southward appurtenances being left on the ground" [34]. The war against the earthquake cottages, ostensibly waged out of concerns for public safety, appeared to be speedily degenerating into a race to clear the land, daydreaming of the human being toll.

32Genuine concerns most public health provided an excellent rationalization for those who sought to destroy the cottages for development purposes. The largest number of plague cases were establish in Lobos Square Park, also the camp in which the nigh cottages remained [35]. The Board of Public Works, acting on Board of Health instructions issued in September 1907, refused to upshot the permits necessary for the transfer to privately owned lots of the refugee cottages remaining in urban center parks. The Relief Committee finally negotiated terms with the Health and Public Works Boards then that the relocation of the cottages could resume. These terms included new sanitation regulations requiring the installation of foundations, fire-resistant roofs, and plumbing facilities. These requirements slowed the rate of movement considerably [36]. Also commencement in September 1907, the Boards of Health and Public Works, without evidence that the cottages harbored disease, systematically burned those without plumbing that were located exterior the parks and in neighborhoods in which a instance of the disease had been reported. Once a cottage was slated for condemnation, only twenty-4 to forty-eight hours notice was given to its occupants. In a cruel repetition of the 1906 disaster, homes were often burned with article of furniture and belongings still inside [37].

The role of location in the wholesale destruction of homes

33The post-obit year a vastly expanded programme of destruction resulted in the mass demolition of 2,190 working class homes, including one,512 identified as "refugee cottages" [38]. In October 1908, the Wellness Board, working with the U.Due south. Public Wellness Service, began systematically reviewing housing inspection reports, condemning and destroying housing deemed "substandard". Significantly, in a parallel action, the Health Board in November 1908 declared bubonic plague eradicated from the entire San Francisco peninsula. Earthquake cottages and other refugee homes were all the same destroyed in quick order, followed by lodging houses, hotels, and apartment buildings. The Wellness Board issued three possible orders for a building establish to be in violation of the wellness code. Very rarely, the Board gave the owner time to make improvements and pass a reinspection. More oft, the Board ordered the building torn down inside sixty days. Most common by far, fifty-fifty without the threat of plague to justify such severe activeness, was the order that the building be torn down within thirty days [39].

34Location, rather than condition, increasingly dictated a cottage's fate. Housing condemnations rose to a climax in 1911, with a total of i,056 residences condemned in that yr alone, before tapering off and finally stabilizing in 1915 (Tabular array 1). Nearly condemned homes were located in clearly defined clusters, the largest of which was the Harbor View commune (the nowadays-day Marina district), followed by the neighborhoods south of Market Street and on Telegraph Hill, with pregnant numbers in the Mission district, likewise as outlying working-class areas to the west and s. The Wellness Board often reviewed houses en masse. For instance, in a single meeting held on 9 March 1911, information technology condemned as public health hazards 118 homes in the due south of Market place district, most of them refugee cottages [xl].

Tab. 1

Dwellings Condemned by the San Francisco Board of Wellness, October 1908-December 1915

Dwellings Condemned by the San Francisco Board of Wellness, October 1908-December 1915

Fig. 2

Houses Condemned past the San Francisco Board of Health, 1910-1915

Houses Condemned by the San Francisco Board of Wellness, 1910-1915

35Sources: Base map from Issel and Cherny, 59 (modifications by authors); housing data derived from Board of Health Meetings, SFMR, 1910-1915.

36In the wake of the housing destruction, the ACSF conducted eighty-two case studies in the summer of 1912. They certificate the disruption losing their homes brought to many poor San Franciscans. One-tertiary of the eighty-ii families studied were suffering ongoing housing crises, indicating the full general chaos and insecurity that the Wellness Board's policies created. For instance, when Mrs. Owen and her two baby girls and 4 young boys found themselves homeless while Mr. Owen was in the infirmary, the ACSF was but able to arrange temporary housing for them in a cottage scheduled to be torn down within lx days. Another case involved the Page family, described past the case workers as a "blind peddler, his palsied married woman", and their young son, all unemployed and merely able to survive "because they have lived since the burn in a shack on basis on which they pay no rent", and in which they now nervously awaited discovery by the Health Board. Non only the destitute suffered from the Wellness Board's actions. By living in a house made of two refugee cottages, the Andrews and their six children had managed to save $400.00. With an boosted $200.00 borrowed from a friend, they purchased a lot. They were arranging to motion their home when the Board of Health had 1 of the cottages torn down, leaving the family crowded into the remaining ii rooms. To help build a house on their lot, they applied to the ACSF for a housing grant in March 1912, but the agency was so overwhelmed with cases that in June the Andrews family still waited for an respond [41].

Making way for the 1915 Panama-Pacific international exposition

37South of Market Street and Telegraph Colina were among the oldest neighborhoods in San Francisco. Despite their proximity to the key commercial and financial districts, their residents were among the city's poorest. But the largest concentration of condemned residences past far was in the Harbor View commune, located betwixt Fort Mason and the Presidio. Between Apr and December 1911, wholesale condemnations emptied a strip of land two blocks wide by 13 blocks long. Other condemnations occurred nearby. The Board condemned 151 refugee cottages at their thirty November meeting lonely. One hundred and nineteen of those condemned were within a single block adjacent to Lobos Square Park (the nowadays-day Moscone Playground). With other empty lots, this added a six by two block long rectangle of land to the strip already razed. Between 1911 and 1912, four hundred and xv homes were condemned within this expanse, comprising virtually ane sixth of the total number condemned in San Francisco from 1908 to 1915 [42].

38Why was such intensive attending paid to the Harbor View district? Was it really driven by concerns for public health? Earlier the burn down the district was of mixed utilise. It was the site of industries such as Pacific Ammonia and the Fulton and Risdon Atomic number 26 Works, all major employers until the earthquake forced their closure. Harbor View had likewise been the site of many working form homes and undeveloped lots [43]. Harbor View's Lobos Square became the site of the largest camp with the poorest refugees, with at one time a density of 1,496 earthquake cottages. It was the last campsite to be closed [44]. Cottagers oft moved their homes into the immediate neighborhood, onto readily available lots in big tracts of undeveloped land owned past some of San Francisco'southward wealthiest families [45]. In modernistic terms, Harbor View, with its sunny, bayside location, and undeveloped lots was ripe for urban redevelopment. In early 1911 the U.South. Congress confirmed San Francisco as the host city for the 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exposition (Rydell, 1984, 217). Only working-class renters and cottagers stood in the way of Harbor View becoming the fair site.

39It is no coincidence that housing condemnations peaked in 1911 following San Francisco'south win in the contest to host the Exposition. Preparations for the Exposition began in 1904, but they intensified after the 1906 earthquake and fire. In sharp contrast to the small sums local businesses donated to relief and charity efforts, Exposition organizers hands raised vast amounts. In but under one hr, 2,000 participants at a meeting held in 1910 at the San Francisco Merchants' Substitution purchased over $four 1000000 in Exposition Company stock. Over $250,000.00 of this amount came from the city's largest hotels. Past the end of 1910, the Exposition Company had more than $6 meg in greenbacks, plus $5 million to be raised from a city bond issue, and an additional $5 million pledged from a state subsidy (Issel and Cherny, 1986, 167-168).

40This outpouring of support reflects the business community'southward uniting with the city'due south cultural aristocracy, professional, and middle classes in support of the Exposition on the Harbor View site. When James "Sunny Jim" Rolph, business leader and the fair's most enthusiastic booster, was elected mayor, this alliance was cemented. At the same time that Rolph, as Issel and Cherny put it, "smothered partisanship with his hearty conviviality and effusive love for his city", he also ran his administration, in his own words, as "a concern corporation of which the citizens are the responsible shareholders" (Issel and Cherny, 1986, 168; Hicke, 1978, 25). But these shareholders did not include poorer working class San Franciscans.

41In early 1912, the Exposition Company had completed surveys of the 425 acres of city land and the 260 acres in the Presidio army base that comprised the Harbor View fair site. The Company awarded contracts for filling the country along the bayshore, repairing the seawalls, and building railroad tracks onto the site [46]. Demonstrating eager civic participation, the San Francisco Board of Public works provided $sixty,000.00 raised from a bond effect to extend sewage systems through the fair site into the bay, significantly increasing the land's value for futurity sale [47]. By fifteen March 1912, the Exposition Visitor had arranged the purchase or lease of 70 per cent of the site, more often than not through payment of taxes owed on it. The Company worked feverishly to negotiate terms for the remaining 30 per cent. These were largely backdrop endemic by the Pacific Realty Visitor and a few individuals and families. Included in the land total were many twenty-five foot lots, upon which, co-ordinate to the Exposition Company, "some poor people [had] homes". By June 1912, the Company had caused most of the land information technology needed to stage the exposition [48].

42The final element necessary was the removal of the many modest houses and refugee cottages remaining on the Harbor View site. The Exposition Visitor purchased the houses, and sold them singly to the highest bidder on the status that they exist removed within thirty days of the auction. In the process, the Company fabricated what its Director of Works termed "quite a considerable sum" on these sales [49]. Cottage removal was achieved past tactics rather less honorable. Although there had been no new plague outbreaks for more than three years, the Exposition Company Building and Grounds Committee reported its successful effort to enlist the help of the Health Board in belatedly 1911 and 1912 to remove the cottages, charging that they posed a general health hazard: "The Board of Health […] at the request of this Committee, is insisting upon the property owners in the Harbor View Commune removing the unsanitary refugee shacks that are on their belongings". The demolition of buildings not promptly taken down by their owners was ordered by the Board [50]. Employing the aforementioned tactics used before to clear urban center parks and neighborhoods of undesirable cottages and the poor families living in them, the Lath of Wellness ordered refugee homes destroyed—ostensibly for health reasons, but conspicuously to empty the fair site prior to its redevelopment [51].

Cottage owners respond: resistance and loss

43The extent of the combined pressure level by city authorities and fair organizers to force property owners to adios refugee families is farther illustrated by city and Exposition Company reaction to resistance to their plans. The owner of nigh 100 cottages located on two blocks near Lobos Square secured a temporary restraining order on January 30, 1912, prohibiting the Health Board from removing or destroying the structures. The Exposition Building and Grounds Committee, aided by San Francisco Metropolis Chaser Percy V. Long, joined forces with the Health Section to preclude the order from existence made permanent. The fight dragged on. On July 11, 1912, Public Health Service housing inspector, Dr. T. Thousand. Howe wrote to Fred Fifty. Hansen, a builder working with the Exposition Company, ordering the removal or destruction of these and other cottages. In this letter, which was forwarded to the Exposition Director of Works, Howe best-selling receipt of an Exposition map of the Harbor View district detailing the areas to be cleared. In a argument that had nothing to do with public health, Howe assured Hansen that with the backing of the Exposition, the Aureate Gate Valley Improvement Clan of Property Owners, and the San Francisco Attorney's office, "every effort will be made in having the shacks removed" [52]. These exchanges provide unequivocal evidence that the city's elite used public services to disappropriate poor working families of their homes in the interest of development. They too provide evidence to back up Rozario's statement that the "logic of creative devastation […] helps to explain why so many well-positioned Americans at the turn of the last century expected conflagrations to produce textile benefits, even if those benefits were non shared by all" (Rozario, 2007, 98).

44The 1911 example studies made by the ACSF reveal the disruption and hardship experienced by families whose Harbor View cottages were condemned by the Health Board. Unabridged blocks of homes were condemned in April 1911, including that belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Tonari and their four children. The family's income was irregular, but they had managed to live independently. Their eviction fabricated this doubtful. Just a couple of blocks away, in a row of cottages condemned in May 1911, lived Mrs. White, recently deserted by her married man. According to the caseworker, Mrs. White "[could] not back up [her three toddlers] independently". She had lost all the male support on which she had previously relied: her husband had left, her brother no longer boarded with her, and her male parent provided no help. The San Francisco Children's Agency placed her children in foster homes, to which Mrs. White was expected to contribute from her meager earnings from occasional house or factory work. She awaited the destruction of her domicile, which would leave her with nothing at all. The ACSF did not await that these or whatsoever of the many other families evicted from their cottages would be able to pay the high rents demanded elsewhere in San Francisco [53].

45The Exposition Company's plans went forward and Harbor View was emptied of its people and houses. The city's business and political elites, seeking to ensure their own economic recovery and profit, dismantled working class neighborhoods on the pretext of public health protection. Poor people fought to go along their homes, only they were powerless against the combined forces of city authorities and individual developers whose plans to revitalize the city did non include provisions for the poor.

Opportunities squandered

46The total story of the initial promise and ultimate tragedy of the earthquake cottages has been ignored by almost scholars. In the about extensive survey to engagement of disaster-era San Francisco, Frandkin plays scant attending to them and focuses rather on presenting a city in total ruin. Yet even in his determinedly grim presentation of post-earthquake San Francisco, a few glimmers of hope announced. Two photographs including earthquake cottages appear in Fradkin'southward richly illustrated volume, although they are not best-selling or identified. In one photograph, three of the small, sturdy houses are clearly visible on former street-fronts amidst the ruins. In a explanation of another photograph he writes, "a young girl on the swing attached to the leafless branches of a dead tree, the only sign of life in a scene of utter desolation". Yet next to the blank just conspicuously still living tree, only halfway within the frame of the photo, is the tidy earthquake cottage that is home to the swinging girl (Fradkin, 2005, 344-a, 344-c).

47The vision of thousands of these single-family homes proudly dotting the neighborhoods of San Francisco failed to materialize when it was most needed, in the years immediately following the convulsion. Information technology was quashed past desires for commercial gain in the post-disaster metropolis, carried out to varying degrees under the ruse of public health concerns. The ultimate failure of the "brusque but successful experiment in cocky-sufficiency for the less affluent" noted by Fradkin should non be viewed by urban planners and disaster specialists as inevitable (Fradkin, 2005, 215). The story of San Francisco's convulsion cottages offers a blueprint for disaster for the poor, if corruption and the desire for turn a profit overshadow the demand for pocket-size, affordable housing. It also suggests some possibilities for hope, if support and infinite for prophylactic, affordable housing for depression-income Americans become pregnant components in contemporary recovery plans for disaster-struck areas.

Epilogue: honored in hindsight

48More than a hundred years after their original structure, and despite the many efforts to destroy them, a surprising number of earthquake cottages have survived to the benefit of future generations (Henderson, 2005, 188). Their humble origins obscured by added porches, bedrooms, kitchens, and bathrooms, convulsion cottages still business firm San Franciscans, and stand equally a attestation to the effort in a time of great loss and suffering to create unproblematic, decent housing for people in need [54]. Motivated in part by family histories in which the cottages played a critical role in helping survivors recover from the 1906 disaster, a group of San Franciscans successfully campaigned in the 1980s to accept some surviving cottages declared city landmarks. The group formed the Western Neighborhoods Projection and, equally part of the 2006 commemoration of the earthquake, restored four cottages to their original form. These have been displayed in public spaces. In recognition of the importance of the Western Neighborhoods Project's work in bringing the earthquake cottages back into the public eye, in 2007 the arrangement won the prestigious Governor's Celebrated Preservation Award [55]. Ane hundred years afterward the earthquake cottages were denounced every bit wellness hazards, they take been celebrated as testaments to the urban center's tenacity and its commitment to decent, affordable housing in the wake of disaster.

Notes

• [1]

  For pre-20th century San Francisco, run into for example, Vance, 1964; Issel and Cherny, 1986; Tygiel, 1992; Ethington, 1992; Dreyfus, 2008.

• [2]

  Land-make full creates notoriously unstable country, liable to sudden collapse and shifts during earthquakes.

• [3]

  Associated Charities of San Francisco (ACSF) case studies, 1912, carton 2, ACSF, San Francisco Labor Council Papers (SFLCP), Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

• [iv]

  Daniels, 1990, 17, 21, 99; ACSF case studies, carton ii.

• [5]

  Issel and Cherny, 1986, 70-73; Shumsky and Springer, 1981, 74, 76; Rosen, 1982, 122; SFLCP carton ii, Asiatic Exclusion League, Anti-Jap Laundrey League. See likewise Tong, 1994; Yamato, 1986.

• [6]

  U.Due south. Committee on Industrial Relations, "Unemployment in California", vol. five, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1915; U.S. Committee on Industrial Relations, "The Seasonal Labor Problem in Agriculture" (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1915); Tygiel, 1992, 24-25; Saxton, 1971, 143-144; McWilliams, 1935, 26-27, 65-72; Averback,1973, 201-203.

• [vii]

  Tygiel, 1992, 38-39; Thomas and Witts, 1971, 249. For a study of residential hotels focusing on San Francisco, come across Groth, 1994.

• [8]

  For case, in Issel and Cherny's archetype work, city politics proceed as usual and near the only reference to the 1906 disaster is passing: a "decade of disharmonize, dramatically punctuated past the convulsion and burn down of 1906" (Issel and Cherny, 1986, 155). The reduction of the 1906 disaster and its aftermath to a dramatic punctuation persists equally well in works devoted entirely to the convulsion and burn. Henderson insists on the continuity of social relations in spite of unresolved contradictions over whether or non the 1906 disaster brought any significant change to San Francisco (Henderson, 2005, 4-6, 159).

• [9]

  Postal service-disaster housing bug in 1906 San Francisco also shed significant light on the evolution of housing in more than recent post-disaster American cities, nearly specially New Orleans during the lengthy housing crunch post-obit the Hurricane Katrina disaster in August 2005. See, Journal of American History Special Outcome, 2007.

• [x]

  Fradkin, 2005, 70-73, 190. Estimates of fatalities in 1906 accept been highly controversial. The municipal government issued initial statistics that showed 322 "known dead". Energetic piece of work past San Francisco librarian Gladys Hansen in the late twentieth century is responsible for the hitting upward revision of these statistics (Fradkin, 2005, 189-191).

• [xi]

  A. West. Greely, Study of Major General A.West. Greely on San Francisco Relief (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Function, 1906, 214-15); Lewis, 1980, 191; Cherny and Issel, 1981, 37.

• [12]

  Classic histories of San Francisco do not mention housing reconstruction. The about contempo journalistic handling of the 1906 disaster, published in 2005, tells it as a story of "manipulation and corruption of power". A modern mean solar day muckraker, its author does not enquire if the 1906 disaster brought about change. Rather, he examines a wide range of errors, incompetence, and abuse committed earlier, during, and later 1906, just briefly mentioning the housing solution in the immediate aftermath of the disaster as "a curt merely successful experiment in self-sufficiency for the less affluent" (Fradkin, 2005, xvii, 215.).

• [13]

  Charities and the Eatables sixteen (2 June 1906) 285. Urban regeneration has been explored most recently in Rozario, 2007; Vale and Campanella, 2005.

• [14]

  Nancy Quam-Wickham, "'The Right to Board and Lodge Where and with Whom Nosotros Please': Dimensions of Boarding and Lodging in a Working-Class District, San Francisco, 1880-1900", unpub. mss. in authors' possession, May 1988, eight.

• [15]

  Run across http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/collections/earthquakeandfire/exhibit/room04_item04.html; Fradkin, 2005, 224.

• [sixteen]

  Boyer, 1978, 224; meet Katherine Felton, "Work of the Associated Charities in Connexion with the Clearing of Camps and the Permanent Housing of Refugees", Annual Reports of the Associated Charities, 1907.

• [17]

  Rozario, 2007, 97; Edward Devine to James D. Phelan, "Recommendations submitted to the Finance Committee, July 10, 1906", in Russell Sage Foundation, San Francisco Relief Survey (NY: Survey Associates, Inc., 1913) 394-95.

• [18]

  A. Due west. Greely, Written report of Major General A. W. Greel, 129.

• [19]

  Run into Fradkin, 2005, 224.

• [20]

  ACSF Case Studies 1912, carton 2, SFLCP, Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley. In accordance with Bancroft Library guidelines, names have been changed to protect the privacy of families.

• [21]

  Anna Simpson, The Story of the Associated Charities since the Fire of 1906 (San Francisco, 1909), 9-10.

• [22]

  Joseph A. Steinmetz, Pennsylvania Branch Ruby-red Cross, to Mabel T. Boardman, National Red Cross, August 11, 1909; August 20, 1909, Red Cross Papers (RCP), National Archives, Washington, D.C.

• [23]

  Simpson, Story of the Associated Charities, xiv-17, nineteen.

• [24]

  Felton to Major General George W. Davis, National Red Cantankerous, September 21, 1907, RCP.

• [25]

  Meet for example, Boyer, 1978.

• [26]

  "Contagious Diseases Reports", and "Lath of Health Reports", San Francisco Municipal Reports (SFMR), 1905-1910.

• [27]

  "Board of Health Report", SFMR, 1907-1908, 481-83.

• [28]

  R. Briones to Dohrmann, September 23, 1907; Kelton to Dohrmann, September 24, 1907, RCP; "Board of Health Report", SFMR, 1907-1908.

• [29]

  Dohrmann to Boardman, National Blood-red Cross, April xxx, 1907, RCP.

• [30]

  Felton to Major Gen. Davis, National Red Cross, September 21, 1907, RCP.

• [31]

  San Francisco Relate, August 19, 1907; Baronial 23, 1907.

• [32]

  Forward Move, "Resolution to Executive Commission, Relief Corporation", April 29, 1907, RCP; Dohrmann to Boardman, National Ruby Cross, April xxx, 1907, RCP.

• [33]

  San Francisco Relate, Baronial 23, 1907.

• [34]

  San Francisco Chronicle, Baronial 23, 1907.

• [35]

  "San Francisco Board of Health Meeting Minutes", SFMR, 1907-08 to 1915-16; see besides Fradkin, 2005, 222.

• [36]

  R. Briones to Dohrmann, September 23, 1906, RCP; Felton to Dohrmann, September 24, 1907, RCP; SF Board of Wellness Reports, SFMR, 1907-1908.

• [37]

  Letters and reports in Merchants' Association of San Francisco, Civic League of San Francisco, and Citizens Health Committee, cartons six and 12, SFLCP; Rehabilitation Commission, "Written report to American National Cerise Cantankerous", September 28, 1907, RCP.

• [38]

  Information compiled from San Francisco Board of Health Meeting Minutes, SFMR, 1907-08 to 1915-xvi. For the razing of much of the wooden infrastructure in San Francisco's working class neighborhoods, see also Craddock, 2000, 126, 153-155.

• [39]

  SF Board of Wellness Meetings reported in the SFMR, 1908, 1910-1915; "Memorandum on the Charity Needs of San Francisco", October 22, 1910, RCP.

• [40]

  Information compiled from San Francisco Board of Health Coming together Minutes, SFMR, 1907-08 to SFMR, 1915-xvi.

• [41]

  SFAC case studies, 1912, ACSF, carton 2, SFLC Papers, Bancroft Library.

• [42]

  SF Board of Health Study, SFMR, 1911-1912.

• [43]

  Lucile Eaves, "Where San Francisco Was Sorest Stricken", Charities and the Eatables xvi (May five, 1906) 161.

• [44]

  Russell Sage Foundation, San Francisco Relief Survey, 85; San Francisco Relief Committee, Department Reports to Board of Directors, March 19, 1907, RCP.

• [45]

  Buildings and Grounds Commission to Directors of PPIE Co., March 15, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder, PPIE Papers (PPIEP), Bancroft Library.

• [46]

  Unfortunately, this recovery try created fragile landfill that guaranteed the intensification of harm during the 1989 Hill Prieta convulse.

• [47]

  Buildings and Grounds Commission to Director, PPIE, March fifteen, 1912, Edifice and Grounds binder, PPIEP.

• [48]

  Buildings and Grounds Committee to Mastick and Partridge, June 10, 1912, Lease of Property folder, PPIEP.

• [49]

  Director of Works, PPIE Company, to Harry Bogart, April 9, 1912, Removal of Houses, Harbor View Site folder, PPIEP.

• [fifty]

  Buildings and Grounds Committee, PPIE Co., to Directors of the PPIE Co., March 15, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder; Managing director of Works, PPIE Co., to W. Chatfield, March 29, 1912, Removal of Houses, Harbor View Site binder, PPIEP.

• [51]

  San Francisco'southward feel defies the argument presented by Christine Meisner Rosen that poor people exercise a "passive" ability in just occupying space with their homes. Encounter Rosen, 1986, 333. Instead, poor people's home were readily condemned and removed from desired infinite.

• [52]

  Buildings and Grounds Committee, PPIE Co., to Directors of the PPIE Co., March xv, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder; R.G. Brodrick, SF Health Officer, to Harris D.H. Connick, Director of Works, PPIE Co., September 27, 1912; Connick to Brodrick, October 1, 1912; Dr. T.Thou. Howe to Fred L. Hansen, July eleven, 1912; Hansen to Connick, July 15, 1912; Connick to Hansen, July 17, 1912; Removal of Houses, Harbor View Site folder, PPIEP.

• [53]

  ACSF, case studies 1912, ACSF, carton two, SFLCP.

• [54]

  Kathleen Sullivan, "Saving the Cottages that Saved San Francisco in 1906", San Francisco Chronicle, August xx, 2004.

• [55]

  http://www.outsidelands.org/kirkham_shacks.php.

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